Aquinas seems to hold following theses on moral autonomy. «Nobody imposes his acts the law»: there is no perfect, no radical autonomy. Natural law is defined as participation in the eternal law. That means «theonomy» which for Kluxen is not primordial, but adventitious metaphysical interpretation. We could speak of «cognitive autonomy»: human reason is competent to formulate norms and moral judgements. But the cognitive acts are accompanied by voluntary consent: which is natural and necessary in first principles; becomes worlds consens (...) in the natural law conclusions ; and becomes correct desire in prudence and, especially, in «gnome» judgments. (shrink)

La tradición filosófica cristiana, medieval en sentido amplio, hereda de la filosofía griega una valoración positiva de la coacción como instrumento auxiliar de la moralidad. San Agustín la exagera por referencia a la "libido" y al pecado original. Santo Tomás considera "providencial" todo el aparato punitivo del estado. Marsilio de Padua convierte la coacción en meollo de la ley. Suárez concibe la ley como "Imposición" (no democrática) de la voluntad del superior. Ambos parecen sucumbir ante el fenómeno moderno de la (...) "centralización del poder". (shrink)

In this article, we empirically assess the impact of corporate ethical identity (CEI) on a firm's financial performance. Drawing on formulations of normative and instrumental stakeholder theory, we argue that firms with a strong ethical identity achieve a greater degree of stakeholder satisfaction (SS), which, in turn, positively influences a firm's financial performance. We analyze two dimensions of the CEI of firms: corporate revealed ethics and corporate applied ethics. Our results indicate that revealed ethics has informational worth and enhances shareholder (...) value, whereas applied ethics has a positive impact through the improvement of SS. However, revealed ethics by itself (i.e. decoupled from ethical initiatives) is not sufficient to boost economic performance. (shrink)

Quins són els valors que regeixen la nostra vida? I per què vivim amb aquests valors i no amb uns altres? «Els valors van cap a on anem nosaltres perquè van amb nosaltres. ¬I mentre fem camí o mentre el busquem, els valors ens alimenten», diu el filòsof.

Colin Cherry's now famous book has been reissued in a third paperback edition in order to put into our hands an economical as well as genial and perspicuous survey of the state and contours of the so-called communication sciences. Cherry's book is properly speaking a manual, as befits its subtitle: A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism. It is composed of eight synthetic and lucid chapters each of which deals with a central area of the processes of communication. Philosophers of (...) diverse persuasions will find here a handy and reliable guide through an enormous mass of materials dealing with both the formal and the material aspects of human communication. (shrink)

In this article we consider certain elements of the normative theory of Jürgen Habermas in the light of the proposals of Bruce Ackerman, with a view to strengthening a concept of deliberative democracy applied to the legitimation of juridical rules. We do not construct a hierarchy of the two positions, but seek to bring together certain elements to achieve a common project. As the starting point for examining the work of the two authors, we take the scheme proposed by Habermas (...) in Faktizität und Geltung. In this connection, through the work of Ackerman, we intend to fill in some of the gaps that Habermas appears to have left in the theory of radical democracy applied to the law. The work of Ackerman can make a significant contribution to deliberative democracy, to the discourse principle that Habermas defines, and to the contractualist theories from a liberal perspective. The study of these contributions makes possible a critical judgment that enables the legitimation of juridical rules carried out by Habermas to acquire greater practicity. In examining the epistemological status of juridical science and law, we attempt to determine the weight and the performance of normative democracy. In Tarr's view, it is a matter for philosophers to examine direct democracy and its desirability. (shrink)

We prove that everyn-modal logic betweenKnandS5nis undecidable, whenever n ≥ 3. We also show that each of these logics is non-finitely axiomatizable, lacks the product finite model property, and there is no algorithm deciding whether a finite frame validates the logic. These results answer several questions of Gabbay and Shehtman. The proofs combine the modal logic technique of Yankov–Fine frame formulas with algebraic logic results of Halmos, Johnson and Monk, and give a reduction of the representation problem of finite relation (...) algebras. (shrink)

Piguet attempts to characterize the language which is peculiar to philosophy. He rejects the contentions that the language of philosophy should be assimilated either to art or to science, and opts for a language which will serve to suggest an experience to be re-lived. Though the contrasts are interesting, the distinctions are sometimes forced.--R. P. I.

In this extremely well-written study, the author interprets man as striving towards the fullness of his personal freedom, which is achieved in the love of God. Werner's intimate familiarity with the history of philosophy and his awareness of the findings of biology and psycho-analysis enable him to develop his theme with rigor and depth. --R. P. I.

A most interesting attempt to weld together a Marxist and a semiotic approach to art. The Marxist insistence upon the historicity of consciousness and the categories in which it expresses itself is accompanied by a systematic semiotically oriented reflection upon the epistemological conditions of meaning. The principal target of della Volpe's project is the Crocean theme that there is something supra-rational conveyed by a work of art, some cosmic feeling or some ineffable content, accessible only to intuition. Della Volpe's position, (...) on the contrary, is rationalist, though with a very specific twist. (shrink)

We prove that everyn-modal logic betweenKnandS5nis undecidable, whenever n ≥ 3. We also show that each of these logics is non-finitely axiomatizable, lacks the product finite model property, and there is no algorithm deciding whether a finite frame validates the logic. These results answer several questions of Gabbay and Shehtman. The proofs combine the modal logic technique of Yankov–Fine frame formulas with algebraic logic results of Halmos, Johnson and Monk, and give a reduction of the representation problem of finite relation (...) algebras. (shrink)